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Abstract
The evolution of cooperation and communication in communities of individuals is a puzzling problem for a
wide range of scientific disciplines, ranging from evolutionary theory to the theory and application of multi-
agent systems. A key issue is to understand the factors that affect collaboration and communication evolution.
To address this problem, here we choose the environmental risk as a compact descriptor of the environment in
a model world of simple agents. We analyse the evolution of cooperation and communication as a function of
the environmental risk. Our findings show that collaboration is more likely to rise to high levels within the
agent society in a world characterised by high risk than in one characterised by low risk. With respect to the
evolution of communication, we found that communities of agents with high levels of collaboration are more
likely to use less complex communication than those which show lower levels of collaboration. Our results
have important implications for understanding the evolution of both cooperation and communication, and the
interrelationships between them.
1 Introduction
Understanding how cooperation between unrelated
individuals can arise in animal and human societies has
puzzled evolutionary theorists. Early solutions to the
problem were found in terms of reciprocal altruism; the
mutual exchange of benefits between pairs of
individuals (Trivers 1971, Axelrod & Hamilton 1981,
Axelrod 1984, Roberts & Sherratt 1998). More
recently, 'indirect reciprocity', in which individuals
who are seen to be more generous receive more help
from others, has been proposed as an additional route
to cooperation (Alexander 1987, Nowak & Sigmund
1998, Leimar & Hammerstein 2001).
In these models individuals have information about the
past behaviour of others on which to base decisions but
there is no communication of intentions: individuals
simply act; cooperating, defecting or declining to
interact. (This is in contrast to the evolutionary
modelling of competitive behaviour in which signalling
has played a central role: e.g. Maynard Smith 1974,
Enquist 1985.) Although there seems to be little
theoretical work on intentional signalling in the context
of cooperation, arbitrary signals correlating with
altruism (the ‘green beard effect’, Dawkins 1976), tags
indicating individual identity (Riolo et al. 2001) and
signalling of partner quality (Leimar 1997) have been
considered. While existing evolutionary models of
cooperation are important in examining the minimal
conditions for the evolution of cooperation they are
also impoverished - at least for the human case - in
excluding the possibility that, intentionally or
unintentionally, individuals may communicate their
intention to cooperate before interacting. In the
development and maintenance of human relationships
cooperation is accompanied by signals of short-term
intentions and longer term commitment. Honest
communication, and consequent trust, are of the
greatest importance for the development of a stable
collaborative relationship; deceit and mistrust are
inimical to it (Boon & Holmes 1991).
In this paper we develop an agent world model to
examine the evolution of cooperation when individuals
communicate their intentions. This communication
helps individuals to decide whether to enter into
cooperation with another: it allows partner choice.
Many of the earlier models provide no such choice, so
that cheats can be avoided only if individuals have
information on their past behaviour. When the
behaviour of others is to some extent predictable,
however, individuals can derive the intentions of others
and cooperators can choose to interact with other
cooperators while cheats can be ostracized (Roberts
1998).
We ask how cooperation and communication respond
to variation in the risk or complexity of the
environment. Risk and complexity are important
general properties of the environment that impact on an
individual's success in ways that can be influenced by
cooperating with others. For example, resources may
be predictable (low risk) or unpredictable (high risk),
and threats from predators or competitors may vary in
a similar way. Resource acquisition, the avoidance of
predators and success in competition can all be
enhanced by collaboration with others.
The second focus of the paper is how the complexity of
communication itself evolves in this context and
whether it differs between cooperators, cheaters and
those who decline to interact at all. This interest in the
communication of intentions follows other work in
artificial societies (e.g. Schillo et al. 2000), which
investigate how collecting information about the
intentions of other agents can enhance the development
of collaboration.
Our agents communicate by sequences of signals, each
of which informs the potential partner about the
cooperative intentions of the agent. The reliability of
the signals differs between agents, who use the
information from communication in present and past
interactions to make decisions about whether to share
resources with a potential partner. The interaction
between agents occurs within a risky environment
where risk refers to the variability of the gains that
result from cooperative behavior. Our results will be
applicable to agent societies, animal societies, and
human social systems.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we
describe the agent world model. Next, we present the
simulation results. Finally, we discuss the implications
of our results.
2 The agent world
In this section we describe the world of our agents. We
start with the description of the environment, followed
by the description of the agents, communication
processes, resource management, the offspring
generation rules, and we close with the description of
the evolution of the agent society. We also present
some argumentation to support our choices with
respect to the implemented principles, rules and
methods.
2.1 The environment
The environment of our agent world is characterized by
a given risk. The environmental risk represents in a
compact way the complexity of the surrounding
environment. The environmental risk is implemented
as the variance of the agent’s resource regeneration
process.
2.2 The agents
Our agents dispose over some generic resources that
they use to maintain themselves and to reproduce.
Each agent speaks the same communication language
consisting of the symbols: ‘0’,’s’,’i’,’y’,’n’,’h’ and ‘t’.
The meaning of the communication symbols are as
follows: ‘0’ – no intention of communication, ‘s’ –
start of communication, ‘i’ – maintaining the
communication, ‘y’ – indication of the willingness to
engage into resource sharing, ‘n’ – indication of no
further interest in communication, ‘h’ – effective
sharing of the resources, ‘t’ – not sharing the resources
after an indication of willingness to engage into
sharing. The last two symbols, ‘h’ and ‘t’ actually
mean the resource-sharing or no-resource-sharing
actions. The first four symbols are ranked according to
their positive contribution towards engagement in
sharing (the least positive is the ‘0’ and the most
positive is ‘y’).
The agents generate communication units (i.e., one of
the above symbols) when they engage in
communication with another agent. Each agent has its
own realization of the language. This language is
represented in the form of a two-input probabilistic
automaton (i.e., it is equivalent of a probabilistic push-
down automaton). The language units are production
rules of the form
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is the last communication unit produced
by the agent, U
current
’ is last communication unit
produced by the partner of the agent, U
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U
new,k
are the new communication units that can be
produced by the agent, and p1,p2,…,pk are the
probabilities of production of these communication
units, p1+p2+…+pk=1 (an example of a such rule is:
L: i,i’
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 n that means that after
producing the symbol ‘i’, and receiving a symbol ‘i’
from the communication partner, the agent will
produce the symbol ‘y’ with probability 0.4, the
symbol ‘i’ with probability 0.5, and the symbol ‘n’
with probability 0.1).
The language units obey intention consistency rules,
i.e., if U0,U1,U2, and U3 are communication units, and
U2 is equally or more positive than U1, and U3 is
equally or more positive than U2, and L1 is a language
unit that produces U3 after U1 and receiving U0 , and
L2 is a language unit that produces U3 after U2 and
receiving U0, then the probability of producing U3
using L2 is equal or higher than the probability of
producing U3 using L1. Similarly, if L1 is a language
unit that produces U3 after U0 and receiving U1 , and
L2 is a language unit that produces U3 after U0 and
receiving U2, then the probability of producing U3
using L2 is equal or higher than the probability of
producing U3 using L1. In other words the intention
consistency rules mean that more positive inputs are
more likely to lead to positive outputs than are less
positive inputs. This choice of the intention consistency
rules is in agreement with human and animal behavior,
where the expression of friendly signals is more likely
to be followed by further friendly signals by the same
individual than non-friendly signals.
Each agent has a characteristic intention, which
indicates the extent to which it is willing to share
resources with other agents. This sharing intention
determines the probability of the y,y’
 
h production
rule.
The agents are equipped with a memory. The memory
of the agents can store the experiences of collaboration
with the last M different partners (M=10 in our
implementation). The memory of the agents also fades
with time, and if they don’t meet an old partner for
long time they forget their memories about this partner.
For each memorized partner the agent keeps the score
of the successful and unsuccessful meeting (i.e.,
successful means a meeting that led to getting shared
resources from the partner).
The agents are located on a two dimensional plane, and
they may change their location. The location of an
agent determines the neighbourhood of the agent that
consists of the N (N=10) closest agents.
The agents live for T (T=60) time units. In each time
unit they try to find a collaboration partner in their
neighbourhood. At the end of their life time the agents
produce their offspring.
2.3 Communication processes
After selecting a collaborating partner the agents may
engage in a communication process. The
communication process starts properly after both
agents communicated the ‘s’ symbol. We set a limit
(L
1
) for the preliminary communication. If the two
agents do not reach the proper start of the
communication in a communication of length L
1
we
consider that they stop their communication at this
moment.
During the communication process the agents use their
own realization of the common language to produce
communication units. The communication process ends
either with the communication of an ‘n’ symbol (i.e.,
signalling no further interest), or with the
communication of the ‘y’ symbol by both partners.
After this each agent decides whether to share or not to
share their resources with the other agent by producing
the action symbol ‘h’ or ‘t’. We impose a
communication length limit (L
2
) on the proper
collaboration oriented communication. If the agents do
not reach the stage of communicating the ‘y’ symbols
in L
2
communication steps, we consider that they stop
their communication.
At the start of each communication process, the agents
update their language unit probabilities according to
their memories of the agent they are currently
interacting with (note that if there had been no previous
interaction with this agent there is no update). The
updated version of their language applies only to the
present communication process. In the case of more
positive experiences (those that led to sharing) the
probabilities leading to more positive symbols are
increased, while in the case of negative experiences
these are decreased. The probabilities for each
language unit are normalized after effecting the above
changes (i.e., the probability of producing all the
allowed new symbols is always one for each language
unit).
During each communication process, as an agent
produces equally or more positive symbols their
willingness to share increases. We note that although
this increase happens in all agents, those who have
very low intention to collaborate will increase an
originally low probability, which means that they will
not necessarily share at the end of the communication
process. We adopted this collaboration willingness
increase principle in conformity with human and
animal behavior, where a sequence of expression of
friendly signals increases the likelihood of the friendly
ending of the interaction, even if the original intentions
were less friendly.
2.4 Resource management
The agent dispose over their own resources that they
use to maintain themselves and reproduce. In each turn
the agents use their available resources to produce new
resources. If they manage to find a partner who is
willing to share its resources they can use the
combined resources to generate the new resources for
the next turn.
The mean resource generating function is a squashing
function of the form:
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where R is the amount of available resources, and R
0
and a are parameters. Operating at the convex half of
the squashing function (i.e., R < R
0
) means that using
more added resources is more advantageous than using
the resources separately.
Resource generation happens in a probabilistic manner.
The environmental risk specifies the variance of the
resource regeneration process. The amount of new
resources is found by taking a sample from a uniform
distribution that has the calculated mean and the
variance specified by the environmental risk. We use
the notation N(R) for the amount of new resources
generated by using R amount of available resources.
The variance of the resource regeneration increases
with the time spent in negotiation about resource
sharing. This risk increase principle is in agreement
with how environmental risk changes in the real world.
To exemplify it we consider an example from business.
If two companies start negotiations about a joint
business, lengthy negotiations may proceed while a
competitor enters in the market, and the final gain of
the two collaborating companies will be reduced. At
the same time lengthy negotiations may lead to a well-
designed contract that makes possible to avoid future
impasses, making the collaboration more profitable. If
the negotiations are short, the deal is made quickly, and
the companies may start gaining some new market
share. At the same time they may run into some
unregulated disputes that may slow down their
cooperation and the increase of their market share. As
we can see from this example, if the communication
process is short the variance of the expected benefits is
likely to be smaller than in the case when the
communication process becomes lengthy.
When two agents meet, having resources R1 and R2,
and they both decide to share their resources they may
receive extra new resources. The extra resources for
both partners are calculated as the half of the difference
N(R1+R2) – (N(R1) + N(R2))
Such agents are called collaborators.
If an agent is engaged in a communication process,
convinces its partner to share, but then withholds its
own resources from sharing, it is called a cheater. The
gain of a cheater is the whole amount of the difference
N(R1+R2) – (N(R1) + N(R2))
In such case the one that is cheated generates only
N(R2) new resources for itself, i.e., it does not benefit
from the sharing.
If two agents select each other as communicating
partners, but they do not manage to decide about the
sharing of their resources (i.e., their communication
end with an ‘n’ symbol) we call them non-
collaborators.
If an agent does not reproduce enough resources to
maintain itself (i.e., the maintenance costs are higher
than the amount of own resources) the agent reaches
the zero resource level and dies.
2.5 Offspring generation
When the agents reach the end of their lifetime they
generate their offspring. The number of the offspring
depends on the available resources of the agent.
If the agent has R resources, and the mean amount of
the resources in the agent society at that moment is R
m
,
and the standard deviation of the resources is R
s
, then
the number of offspring of the agent is calculated as
0
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n
R
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n
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where α, β, n
0
are parameters.
If n is negative or R=0 we consider that the agent
produces no offspring. If n > n
max
, where n
max
is the
allowed upper limit of offspring, we cut back n to n
max
.
In order to avoid strong generational effects the newly
generated offspring have random ages between 1 and
A
0
.
The offspring of an agent inherit from their parent its
language and collaboration intention with small
random modifications. They also inherit the resources
of their parent equally divided between the offspring.
2.6 The evolution of the agent society
At the beginning we start with randomly initialised
agents, i.e., the transition probabilities of their
language units, their collaboration intentions, initial
resources and initial positions are set randomly.
The agent society evolves through the interaction and
reproduction of the agents. The agents search for
collaborating partners. They try to share their
resources, or to cheat the collaborating partner, or they
may not manage to make the decision about sharing. In
each turn each agent may choose one partner from its
neighbours. After each turn the agents make a random
move, changing their position, and possibly finding a
new neighbourhood.
The agents regenerate their resources alone or in
collaboration with another agent in each turn, and they
pay a part of their resources to maintain themselves. At
the end of their lifetime the agents generate their
offspring if they have enough resources.
3 Simulation results
This section presents our simulation results. The
objective of these simulations were twofold. First, to
determine how environmental risk affects both the
level of collaboration, and the complexity of
communication. Second, to examine how the various
strategists (collaborators, cheaters, non-collaborators)
differ in complexity of their communications in an
evolving society. The results are presented in this
order, after examining some general effects of risk
level on the agent society.
We selected five levels of risk in the range of 0.1 – 0.9
(the risk levels were 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9). We
measured communication complexity by measuring the
average length of the communication processes.
For each risk level we run 20 simulations to obtain
valid estimates of average values and variances of the
measured variables. The number of agents in each
simulation was the same at the beginning (1500). We
run each simulation for 400 time units, or until the
agent population died out or reached the maximum
allowed level of number of individuals (5000).
3.1 General effects of the environmental risk
To see the general effects of environmental risk on the
agent society we looked at how the number of agents
and the resource level varied with time. We considered
the average amount of resources separately for
collaborators, cheaters and non-collaborators.
Figure 1 shows the average number of agents in the
agent societies for the five risk levels. Figures 2 – 4
show the change over time of the average amount of
resources of collaborators, cheaters and non-
collaborators.
The first segment of dropping in the graphs represents
the period when the randomly initialised population
selects those who are able to survive. This segment
corresponds to one generation (i.e., around 60 time
units).
Following the initial drop the societies start to grow in
number and in average amount of resources in all
cases. The graphs show that this growth happens much
faster in agent societies living in low risk environment
than in those which live in high risk environments.
These results confirm the standard expectation that the
average level of populations and their available
resources is lower in high risk environments than in
low risk environments.
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Figure 1: The evolution of the number of agents in
agent societies living in environments with different
risk levels.
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Figure 2: The evolution of the average amount of
resources of collaborators in agent societies living in
environments with different risk levels.
3.2 Environmental risk and the level of
collaboration
To analyse the effect of the environmental risk on the
level of collaboration we looked at the percentage of
collaborators, cheaters and non-collaborators within the
society (note that the percentage of those who were
cheated is the same as the percentage of cheaters). The
change of these percentages over time is shown in
Figures 5 – 7.
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Figure 3: The evolution of the average amount of
resources of cheaters in agent societies living in
environments with different risk levels.
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Figure 4: The evolution of the average amount of
resources of non-collaborators in agent societies living
in environments with different risk levels.
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Figure 5: The evolution of the average percentage of
collaborators within the agent societies living in
environments with different risk levels.
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Figure 6: The evolution of the average percentage of
cheaters within the agent societies living in
environments with different risk levels.
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Figure 7: The evolution of the average percentage of
non-collaborators within the agent societies living in
environments with different risk levels.
The figures show that the level of collaboration
increases in all conditions. After the first generation
(i.e., around 60 time units) the level of collaborators
increases steadily until it stabilizes (above 50%). In the
case of cheaters and non-collaborators there is a
corresponding decline to stabilization at below 18% for
cheaters and below 12% for non-collaborators.
The figures show that the stable level of collaborators
is lower in low risk conditions than in high risk
conditions, and that levels of cheaters and non-
collaborators are higher in low risk conditions than in
high risk conditions. This indicates that the agent
societies living in a high risk environment are more
likely to achieve high level of collaboration than those
which live in low risk environments. We note also than
in the high risk environments it is more likely that the
population dies out than in low risk environments.
3.3 The complexity of communications
We analysed the complexity of communications by
measuring the average length of communication
processes within the whole society.
Figures 8 shows the evolution over time of the
communication complexity in the whole society.
The figure shows that there is no clear ordering of the
stable levels of communication complexity as a
function of the level of environmental risk. The same
is true when each of the three agent strategies is
examined independently.
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Figure 8: The evolution of the average communication
complexity within the whole agent societies living in
environments with different risk levels.
3.4 Collaboration and communication complexity
First we analysed the correlation between the levels of
collaborators, cheaters and non-collaborators and the
average complexity of communications within the
society. These correlations are shown in Tables 1 – 3.
Risk 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.9
Correlation -0.94 -0.98 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99
Table 1: The correlation between the average
percentage of collaborators and the average complexity
of communications within societies living in
environments with various risk levels.
Risk 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.9
Correlation 0.15 0.74 0.93 0.95 0.97
Table 2: The correlation between the average
percentage of cheaters and the average complexity of
communications within societies living in
environments with various risk levels.
Risk 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.9
Correlation 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
Table 3: The correlation between the average
percentage of non-collaborators and the average
complexity of communications within societies living
in environments with various risk levels.
These results indicate that the proportion of
collaborators is strongly negatively correlated with the
complexity of communications at all risk levels. In the
case of cheaters we see that their proportion is
moderately positively correlated with the average
complexity of communications at low risk levels, and
that the correlation gets much stronger for high risk
levels. In the case of non-collaborators their percentage
is strongly positively correlated with the average
communication complexity at all risk levels. These
results together suggest that those who collaborate tend
to communicate in shorter sequences, while those who
cheat or do not collaborate are likely to use longer
communication sequences.
To analyse this suggestion directly, we examined how
communication complexity evolves in the three
different groups at given risk levels. Figures 9 and 10
show two examples for risk levels 0.2 and 0.9.
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Figure 9: The evolution of the average communication
complexity in the groups of collaborators, cheaters and
non-collaborators living an environment characterized
by risk level r = 0.2.
These figures confirm the suggestion that those who
collaborate are likely to use less complex
communication between themselves, and those who do
not collaborate use more lengthy communication
processes.
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Figure 10: The evolution of the average
communication complexity in the groups of
collaborators, cheaters and non-collaborators living an
environment characterized by risk level r = 0.9.
4 Discussion
First, we interpret our results from the more general
point of view of evolution of collaboration and
communication in societies of individuals. Second, we
discuss the implications of the presented results for
agent worlds and multi-agent systems.
4.1 Evolution of collaboration and communication
in societies of individuals
Under the assumptions of our model society,
cooperation can thrive and its frequency increases with
environmental risk, while both cheating and non-
cooperation decline. The increase in cooperation with
environmental risk probably comes about because
cooperation can be crucial for survival when resources
are very low and/or provides particularly large rewards
(compared to cheating) when resources are very high.
This is because while cheating is profitable in the short
term (for a few interactions), in the longer term
cheaters fail to find other agents who will interact with
them. The fact that population size and average
resource level decline as risk increases supports the
conclusion that cooperation becomes increasingly
advantageous in difficult or harsh environments, as
measured by risk.
The prediction that cooperation is more likely in risky
environments can be tested in animal societies, in
human experimental groups and in the real world of
human social and economic behaviour, at the level of
both individuals and of groups such as firms and
nations. For example, this prediction might help to
explain the phenomenon of increased feelings of
community during wartime. It also suggests that
cooperation might be enhanced by increasing the risk
or complexity of the problem at hand. Although there
may also be costs associated with increasing risk, if
perceived risk increased while objective risk remained
unchanged then cooperation might be enhanced
without cost. However, as perceived risk increases the
population of those willing to participate is likely to
decline. A possible application area here is
communication on the Internet, although there would
be ethical issues involved in deceiving users about the
risk or complexity of the Internet environment.
In contrast to its effect on cooperation, environmental
risk in the model had no clear effect on the length of
communication. This may have been because the
model language was too simple, varying between only
4 and 6 elements at the outset. For a richer language we
predict that communications will be shorter as risk
increases since: (1) there is a positive correlation
between collaboration level and risk, and negative
correlations between cheating and non-collaboration
levels and risk (Figures 5-7), and (2) there is a negative
correlation between collaboration level and language
complexity, and positive correlations between
cheating and non-collaboration levels and language
complexity (Tables 1-3).
Those who collaborated had shorter communication
strings than those who cheated or failed to collaborate.
This is because if a collaborator meets an agent for
whom it has a memory biased towards collaboration
then it has higher probabilities of production for
positive communication symbols and therefore moves
more quickly (i.e., with fewer communication steps)
into an interaction that is likely to be collaborative.
Thus collaborating agents, by positive feedback, build
an increasingly cooperative relationship with each
other, in a manner analogous to that described by
Roberts & Sherratt (1998). The direct complement of
this process is that meeting a past cheater for which an
agent has a memory increases that agent’s likelihood of
cheating in the present interaction after a longer series
of communication symbols (see sub-section 2.3 on the
communication process).
Collaboration thus brings with it the bonus of a saving
on communication effort. Such effort may be trivial,
but it may also be considerable, as in some forms of
human negotiation. The prediction that collaboration
simplifies the communication process (compared to
both cheating and avoiding interaction) can be tested in
the scenarios already described for examining the
relationship between cooperation and risk.
4.2 Collaboration and communication in agent
worlds
We see two directions of implications of our work in
the context of agent worlds and multi-agent systems.
First, our results indicate that appropriate setting of the
environmental risk factors of an agent world can
determine to a significant extent the level of
collaboration within the agent world. This may have
applications in the design of multi-agent systems where
the developers wish to achieve some desired mix of
collaborative/non-collaborative behavioural patterns
that fits to the objective of the system. It is important to
note that pure collaborative behavior in an open agent
world may pose significant risks to the proper working
of that world, as malignant agents may appear, and
may abuse the default benevolent behavior of other
agents. This means that some level of non-cooperative
behavior should be allowed in an open agent system
(Sherratt and Roberts 2001).
Second, our results suggest that it is possible to predict
the expectable level of collaboration and
communication complexity in an agent world, if
enough information is available about the
environmental risk factors characterizing this world.
Such predictions can form the basis for checks of the
validity of risk factor assumptions, and for corrective
actions aimed to keep the agent world within the
desired range of macro parameters.
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